This study estimates the relationship between production and salary structure in Major League Soccer (MLS), the highest level of professional soccer (association football) in North America. Soccer production, measured as league-points-pergame, is modeled as a function of a team's total wage bill, the distribution of the team's wage bill, and goals per game. Both the gini coefficient and the coefficient of variation are utilized to measure salary inequality. The results indicate that production in MLS is negatively responsive to increases in the salary inequality; this effect is consistently significant when using the coefficient of variation to measure dispersion.
I. Introduction
Economic theory indicates that the distribution of salaries can affect the productivity of workers and firms. In the theory of tournaments, Lazear and Rosen (1981) discuss the possibility that greater salary inequality can lead to more worker effort and increased productivity.
However, cohesion theory (Levine, 1991) implies firms may be able to increase the productivity of workers by equalizing salaries, since a more equal salary distribution will increase unity within the firm. The implication is that firms with more equal salary distributions will be more productive than similar firms with less equal salary structures. The present study attempts to shed light on the question of the connection between salary structure and productivity using professional sports data. Specifically, this paper analyses the possible effect of a Major League Soccer (MLS) team's payroll distribution on production using data on all MLS salaries from the 2005 through the 2012 seasons. 2007 was an important date in MLS history, as it was the first year of the designated player rule that allowed teams to sign players for salaries in excess of the salary cap. Thus, the data allow for an analysis of the distribution of MLS salaries before and after a significant change in the rules which help define the structure of salaries.
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The professional sports industry has proven to be a fruitful area for salary-related studies, since detailed data exist on player salaries, which is not the case in most other industries (Kahn, 2000) . Unsurprisingly, the inequality of payrolls within professional sports teams has been a topic of recent research, much of it on leagues in North America. 2 Major League Baseball (MLB) has been extensively studied, with most studies finding a negative relationship between team success and intra-team payroll inequality as predicted by Levine's cohesion theory (Richards and Guell, 1998; Bloom, 1999; Depken, 2000; DeBrock et al., 2004; 1 The reader will note that Major League Soccer is properly referred to as "MLS" not "the MLS," in much the same way as Major League Baseball is referred to as "MLB" rather than "the MLB." 2 An exhaustive review of this literature using sports data is given in Katayama and Nuch (2011) . The existing literature on non-sports firms is reviewed by Franck and Nuesch (2011) . Molina, 2004) . The National Basketball Association (NBA) has also been studied, but the relationship between salary dispersion and team success is found to be insignificant (Berri and Jewell, 2004; Katayama and Nuch, 2011) or positive and significant as predicted by tournament theory (Simmons and Berri, 2011) . Less studied North American sports leagues include the National Hockey League (Sommers, 1998) and the National Football League (Frick et al., 2003) .
As noted by Katayama and Nuch (2011 , pp. 1204 and 1205 , the difference in results between MLB and the NBA can be explained by the cooperative nature of the two games. Since basketball requires substantial coordination among the five players on the court, an NBA player may be conditioned to ignore salary inequality as long as other (higher-paid) players are contributing to his current success and future earnings potential. In MLB, outcomes are often determined by individual play, so players may be more selfish when making salary comparisons.
Soccer is a sport that combines the individual-production aspects of baseball and the cooperative-production aspects of basketball, making it an interesting game in which to examine the influence of salary dispersion on team success. Although many soccer matches are decided on the basis of individual match ups and individual skill, extensive integration of play is required for a team to be successful. Franck and Nuesch (2011) analyze the relationship between salary inequality and team success in the German Bundesliga. The authors find a U-shaped relationship, suggesting that teams with little salary inequality would see decreased productivity with increases in inequality (validating cohesion theory) and teams with greater inequality would see greater production with increased salary inequality (supporting tournament theory).
This paper advances the literature by placing the discussion of payroll inequality and team success in the context of North American Major League Soccer. The case of MLS is of particular interest regarding the possible effects of intra-team salary inequality. First, MLS is a professional league with a relatively short history, which has only recently seen significant differences in salaries and salary dispersion among teams. Second, MLS has yet to gain a strong foothold in the North American sports entertainment market, implying that any change in the league's business model needs to be evaluated based on its potential impact on league profitability and survival. Third, MLS is the only major professional sport in North America that has a single-entity ownership structure, so it presents a unique case in terms of league structure.
Measuring salary inequality using both the gini coefficient and the coefficient of variation, this study finds support for the cohesion hypothesis. Specifically, there is a negative relationship between salary inequality and production for MLS teams, implying that increases in salary inequality tend to decrease team-level production, all else constant. As expected, teams with higher wage bills tend to more productive. Thus, MLS teams that choose to expand their wage bills can expect to increase productivity, but they also face a tradeoff in terms of diminished productivity in as much as the increased wage bill also increases salary inequality. (Borg, 2011) : "I believe we will be larger than 20 teams."
Superstar Salaries in MLS
Among professional soccer leagues, MLS is unique in several ways. First, it has a closedleague system, in that there is no promotion and relegation. In this way, the league structure is more like that of other North American sports, such as the National Football League, than professional soccer leagues in Europe. Second, MLS has a single-entity structure. Specifically, the league has an ownership interest in all teams, thereby controlling player contracts, salaries, sponsorships, and broadcasting. In terms of controlling player contracts, players sign with the league and not with individual teams, so that players are contracted to MLS, rather than to the franchises themselves. Further, salaries are paid by the league, and for the most part, player movement is determined by MLS. Third, MLS has a "soft" salary cap, similar to that in the National Basketball Association. The salary cap for the 2012 MLS season was set at $2.81 million per team, although several teams exceeded that amount in salaries, for reasons that will be discussed below. MLS believes that the single-entity structure and salary cap are important to 3 The NY/NJ MetroStars were known simply as "MetroStars" from 1998 to 2006. In 2006, the franchise was sold to Red Bull GmbH and renamed New York "Red Bulls." The Dallas franchise was renamed FC Dallas in 2005, and the Kansas City franchise changed its nickname to "Wizards" in 1997 and then changed the name of the franchise to "Sporting Kansas City" in 2011. The San Jose franchise adopted the nickname "Earthquakes" in 1999, and the team moved to Houston, TX in 2006 and was renamed Houston "Dynamo." A more complete discussion of the history and structure of MLS can be found in Jewell and Molina (2005) .
the long-term success of the league. This structure also allows MLS to legally control the escalation of player salaries, maintain greater homogeneity in the quality of teams, improve league competitiveness, and avoid the large versus small market issues that plague other North American sports.
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Since its inception, MLS has not been an unmitigated financial success, measured as overall profitability or as profitability for individual franchises. Forbes Magazine (Schwartz and Badenhausen, 2008) , 1996 , 1997 , 1999 San Jose/Houston, 2001 , 2003 , 2006 , 2007 LA, 2002 LA, , 2005 LA, , 2011 LA, , 2012 . Compare this to the NFL, generally considered the North American sports league with the highest degree of parity; in the last 17 years, 11 different teams have won the Super Bowl, with only one team winning as many as three titles (New England, 2002 In the end, the opportunity to sign David Beckham was just too good for MLS to pass up.
As a response to the Beckham opportunity, MLS established the designated player rule in 2007.
Sometimes called "the Beckham rule" for obvious reasons, it is designed to allow clubs to expand their teams with high-profile players, the first of whom was David Beckham. Although
Beckham's relationship with the league and his MLS club Los Angeles Galaxy has been somewhat rocky, the impact his signing has had on MLS is clear: The introduction of the Beckham rule in 2007 allowed franchises with larger markets and deeper pockets to spend more on designated players and circumvent the restrictions of the salary cap.
The designated player rule is essentially an exemption to the salary cap, similar to exceptions in past NBA collective bargaining agreements that allowed teams to re-sign their own free agents at salaries that exceeded the salary cap. In the case of the NBA, these exceptions (the most well-known of which being the "Larry Bird exception" for veteran free agents) benefit teams by ensuring that they have an advantage in signing their own players, and they benefit players by effectively removing some of the downward pressure on wages implied by the cap. In MLS, the designated player rule allows the league to sign players of higher quality than would be possible under a hard cap, effectively expanding the pool of potential players and increasing the quality of the league overall. As originally established, individual teams were allowed up to two designated players (DPs). The first DP counted $400,000 against the salary cap, and teams were free to pay as much as they liked above that amount to the DP. The first $400,000 was paid by the league, while anything above that amount was paid by the team. Teams could also sign a second designated player, which would count $325,000 against the cap, with any salary above that amount covered by the franchise.
One cannot help but notice that the DP rule tends to favor large-market teams, or at least those franchises that have higher levels of revenue that can afford to pay for the best players. In an attempt to serve the interests of the largest number of MLS teams, adjustments to the DP rule have been made since 2007. As of the 2012 season, there can be up to three designated players per team, although not all teams use these spots. Each DP costs $350,000 against the salary cap, and teams who choose to have a third DP are required to pay an extra $250,000 in tax to the league. Designated players under age 24 count less than $350,000 against the salary cap, and
DPs signed in the middle of the season only count $175,000 against the cap. Table One summarizes the adjustments made to the DP rule since it was introduced.
[Insert Tables One and Two The total of all DP salaries in 2012 was $36.5 million, the vast majority of which ($26.4 million or 72%) went to nine players on three largemarket teams (Los Angeles, New York, and Toronto). It comes as no surprise that it tends to be the franchises in larger markets that have the most designated players and those making the highest wages.
As a way of leveling the field financially, MLS gives monetary allocations to certain teams that can be used to pay for salaries in excess of the cap. For instance, teams that miss the playoffs are generally given allocation funds for the next season, and teams that lose a player by a transfer to a team outside MLS are given allocation funds as a form of compensation. As mentioned above, if a team has filled two of its DP slots and wishes to acquire a third DP, it may purchase that third slot by making a $250,000 payment to the league. That payment is then split up evenly among all other teams that do not have three DPs in the form of allocation funds.
Allocation money is generally thought of as a way that smaller-market teams can stay competitive with larger-market teams in signing high-priced talent. Specifically, the DP rule allows large-market teams to respond to demand for high-priced talent, while the allocation system allows low-revenue teams to stay competitive by effectively raising their salary caps.
Data and Methodology
The data set includes yearly observations on all teams that competed in MLS from the 2005 to 2012 seasons based on complete salary data from the MLS Players Association. Of the 19 teams that existed over that period, 12 played for the full eight years, one for six seasons The main purpose of this study is to test the hypothesis that salary inequality influences team-level productivity in MLS. A secondary consideration is to test whether cohesion theory or tournament theory better describes MLS production. Salary distribution is measured using the gini coefficient at the team level (Gini) or the coefficient of variation at the team level (CV).
With either theory, ceteris paribus, a higher Gini or CV will influence a team's productivity; the relationship will be negative if cohesion theory holds and positive under tournament theory. The quality of the team will also influence productivity, as better teams should have higher levels of production. Following the literature on productivity in soccer (e.g., Frick and Lee, 2011) , the present study uses the total team wage bill in millions of dollars (Wage) as a measure of overall team quality. A larger wage bill correlates with better overall team quality and should be positively related to productivity. As a further measure of team quality, we also include the number of players who have played on their country's national team in international competition (Nationals). The expectation is that having players with international experience should be positively correlated with higher productivity, ceteris paribus.
Given the unique institutions of MLS, one would expect that teams with longer histories in the league would be more adept at squeezing productivity out of a given amount of team resources. To measure experience, the present study includes the numbers of seasons each team has existed (Seasons), under the assumption that organizations with greater MLS experience will be more productive all else constant. Finally, we include the number of teams each season (Number) to control for the influence of league expansion on the average productivity of teams.
Over the sample time frame, MLS expanded from 12 to 19 teams; this 58 percent increase in teams over a short time period likely diluted the available pool of player talent, which may have changed the competitiveness of the league.
The general production relationship is hypothesized as:
( 1) Points it = (Gini it or CV it , Wage it , National it , Seasons it , Number t ),
where i indexes team, t indexes year, and (.) is a function that maps the dependent variables onto MLS league points-per-game. A priori, the coefficients on Wage, National, and Seasons are expected to be positive, while the remaining coefficients could be either positive or negative.
Summary statistics for the included variables are given in Table Three. [Insert Table Three Here]
Results and Discussion
Based on the work of Franck and Nuesch (2011) , one might expect the functional form of MLS point production to be non-linear. In the next section, we discuss estimates of equation (1) in log-log form. The coefficients from a log-log specification of equation (1) are shown in Table   Four . 7 Column A shows results using the natural log of Gini to indicate salary inequality, and the results shown in column B are based on using the natural log of CV. Columns C and D shows results from re-estimations of A and B adding team-specific effects. 8 With respect to the relationship between MLS production and salary distribution, Table Four indicates that increases in Gini and CV are significantly associated with reduced points-per-game, although the 7 Alternative models were also estimated, including linear, log-linear, and quadratic. Results are available upon request. The log-log model is better than the alternative models in terms of adjusted R 2 , and there is no evidence of an inflection point for Gini or CV as in Frank and Nuesch (2011) . 8 The team-specific effects are suppressed for brevity, but these results are available from the authors upon request. The constant coefficients in columns C and D reflect the excluded team Seattle Sounders FC. The authors also investigate any possible yearly fixed effects, finding no evidence that points-per-game vary by year after controlling for the variables in equation (1). coefficient on Gini becomes insignificant when adding team fixed effects. These results suggest that cohesion theory more appropriately explains this relationship in MLS than does tournament theory. The estimated elasticity of Points with respect to changing Gini or CV shows that MLS production is not highly responsive to changes in the distribution of salaries, as a one percent increase in salary dispersion is predicted to decrease points-per-game by only 0.2 to 0.3 percent depending on the specification. The model with the best fit in terms of adjusted R 2 is reported in column D, using lnCV and including team-specific fixed effects.
[Insert Table Four Here] A team with more Nationals has greater productivity, but this effect is statistically insignificant when using team fixed effects. This result is unsurprising as the fixed effects are expected to capture team skill and efficiency not measured in the wage bill. As expected, a team's wage bill is positively related to its point production; however, this effect is only statistically significant when using lnCV to measure salary dispersion. As expected, teams with more Seasons in the league have greater point productivity. An increase in Number is shown to decrease points-per-game, indicating that expansion leads to a higher probability of a game ending in a tie rather than a win/loss.
Referencing the best-fit model of column D, the estimated elasticity of Points with respect to changing Wage is approximately 0.3. Interestingly, the elasticity of changing Wage and the elasticity of changing CV are of similar magnitude, implying that the degree of responsiveness of point production to changing salary dispersion and to changing the team wage bill are relatively the same. This implication is extremely important for MLS decision makers:
Since signing a high-priced player will likely change the salary distribution as well as increase the wage bill, an MLS team can expect to have increased point production as long as the percentage increase in the wage bill is larger than the percentage increase in salary inequality. 
Responsiveness of MLS team production to changes in salary inequality
The models estimated in Table Four assume that the elasticity of Points with respect to CV is constant over teams. However, the numerical impact of changing salary dispersion on point production will differ from team to team, in as much as points-per-game and CV vary over teams. Specifically, a given change in CV will lead to a larger absolute change in Points for teams that have less salary dispersion and/or more points-per-game. Based on the best-fit model of [Insert Table Six Here]
Responsiveness of MLS to changes in salary inequality over time
The estimation results also allow for an analysis of changes in the marginal effect of CV on Points over time. Given the drastic changes in salary structure caused by the introduction of the designated player rule, one might expect substantial changes in team responses to salary inequality as teams adjust to the new salary paradigm. [Insert Table Seven Here]
Conclusion
Major League Soccer is unique among North American professional sports leagues. MLS has a single-entity ownership structure, has only been in existence since 1996, and has recently seen a change in intra-team salary structure. Because of its unique characteristics, MLS presents an interesting case in which to study the relationship between salary dispersion and team success.
The results from this study indicate a negative relationship between salary inequality and team success in terms of league points. Thus, the present study provides support for the cohesion theory. Further, the best-fit model suggests that increasing salary inequality and the team wage bill work in opposite directions by similar magnitudes, highlighting the tradeoff MLS teams must make when signing high-priced talent.
MLS is a young league that is yet to gain a strong foothold in the North American market; recent attempts to sign high-priced soccer talent through the introduction of the designated player rule may help the league in its efforts to market the professional game.
However, the results from the present study indicate that there will be a cost of signing designated players in terms of lower productivity, if the salaries involved cause significant increases in salary inequality. But, the results also show that increases in a team's wage bill increase productivity, as would be expected if the higher-priced talent is more skilled than existing players. In the end, MLS and the individual teams that comprise the league will need to consider both the cost and benefit in terms of productivity when deciding on whether or not to sign superstar players. Further research is needed to evaluate the impact of the designated player rule on the overall competitiveness of the league, in as much as a competitive league is expected to help the long-term growth prospects of MLS.
An additional consideration for MLS is the influence that superstar players have on attendance and revenues. Lawson et al. (2008) attendance, while the league is likely to be highly focused on revenues. Thus, individual teams may be more concerned about mitigating the negative influence of increasing salary inequality to improve point production, and the league may be concerned about signing high-priced talent to drive revenues. How MLS deals with these conflicting priorities is a subject for future analysis and research. 
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